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This report examines the affects of different types of thinking on rumination.  Because of 
the relationship between rumination and psychopathology, many researchers have 
attempted to understand what types of processing end the ruminative cycle.  Some 
researchers have proposed that thinking concretely (i.e. the specific details of events) will 
end rumination.  These same researchers argue that thinking about events from an 
abstract perspective (general meaning of an event) is detrimental.  However, several 
recent studies have shown that abstract processing under certain conditions can be 
beneficial.  Though both sides of the debate discuss abstract and concrete as existing 
within a hierarchy, research to date has only treated these levels dichotomously. Adopting 
a Goal Progress Theory perspective, this report proposed a study that asks participants to 
traverse through multiple level of the construal hierarchy, and argues for the benefits of 
combining both abstract and concrete processing.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Negative events are certain to arise in each of our lives. Sometimes, we are able to 
process a negative event without major impact on our psychological well-being. At other times, 
we may repetitively focus on the negative consequences of the event, forming a ruminative 
cycle. Addressing this issue, Nolen-Hoeksema defined rumination as “the process of thinking 
perseveratively about one‟s feelings and problems” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008, p. 400). One important reason for understanding the triggers and mechanisms of 
rumination is the connection between rumination and psychopathology (see the review by 
Watkins, 2008). Research indicates that rumination predicts the severity, likelihood, and duration 
of depression and is associated with negative affect (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & 
Alloy, 2001; McIntosh & Martin, 1992). Specifically in the context of negative life events, such 
as a natural disaster or the death of a loved one, a ruminative style predicts future depressive 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). 
Moreover, several studies found negative events may induce short-term rumination, which in 
turn, may increase distress and perpetuate long-term depression (e.g. Moberly and Watkins, 
2008; Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993;Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1992). Because of the relationship between rumination and depression, it is important 
to determine the types of processing that allow one to avoid or break out of rumination.  
 Level of construal, conceptualized as the degree of abstraction present in an individual‟s 
perceptions of events, has recently gained much attention as an important construct in 
understanding rumination (Watkins, 2008). The different levels of construal can be described as 
falling within a hierarchy of mental representations. Whereas high-level construals are abstract 
and represent the purpose or the “why” of a situation, low-level construals are concrete and 
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represent the details or the “how” of a situation (Watkins, 2008; Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 
2004; Liberman & Trope, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). For example, suppose an 
individual experiences an argument with a romantic partner. The individual might adopt a high-
level construal of the situation, thinking, “We do not have a good relationship.” Alternatively, 
the individual could adopt a lower-level construal of the situation, thinking, “I was tired from 
work. I just wanted to have a quiet night together watching a movie. However, when asked to do 
the dishes, I heard the nagging tone in my partner‟s voice. I got angry.” Several experiments 
have demonstrated that adopting a low-level, concrete perspective reduces rumination and 
negative affect in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 
Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Additionally, Watkins and 
colleagues have theorized that adopting high-level, abstract construals during processing of 
negative content is akin to ruminating (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins 
2008).  
 However, evidence is mixed as to whether adopting high-level, abstract construals will 
always yield negative consequences. Kross and Ayduk (2008) found that adopting a high-level, 
yet self-distanced perspective, reduced negative affect when thinking about a negative 
experience. They argue that a distanced analysis of negative events allows an individual to focus 
on the “whys” and meaning of a situation without focusing on symptoms. Additionally, Rude, 
Mazzetti, Pal, and Stauble (2009) manipulated mode of processing in response to a rejection 
experience, and found that non-evaluative, abstract processing was beneficial in reducing 
rumination and negative affect. Thus, research is conflicted with regard to the benefit of higher-
level construals in processing.  
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One theory that offers a possible framework for understanding the relationship between 
level of construal and rumination is Goal Progress Theory (Martin & Tesser, 2006). Goal 
Progress Theory holds that higher-level goals are more enduring, general, and abstract, and 
lower-level goals are more immediate, detailed and concrete. Thus, Goal Progress Theory is a 
useful way to conceptualize level of construal, because levels of construal can be thought of in 
terms of the individual‟s goal hierarchy. For instance, if we examine the earlier example of the 
argument, a higher-level goal could be “having a good relationship” and a lower-level goal might 
be “watching a movie together tonight.” Goal Progress Theory defines rumination as “conscious 
thinking directed toward a given object for an extended period of time” (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 
p. 306). Furthermore, it holds that rumination occurs when achievement of important higher-
level goals is repeatedly thwarted and will continue until the goal is reached, a substitute means 
of attaining the goal is found, or the individual disengages from the goal (Martin & Tesser, 
2006).  
Building upon Goal Progress Theory, this study seeks to examine the different levels at 
which one can process a negative interpersonal event and reduce rumination. Previous studies 
offered conflicting results regarding higher-level, abstract processing and treated level of 
processing as either exclusively low-level or exclusively high-level (e.g., Moberly & Watkins, 
2006; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). To address these limitations, this study will explore whether 
abstract processing can reduce rumination and whether a mixture of abstract and concrete 
processing can reduce rumination more than either concrete processing or abstract processing 
alone. The proposed study asks participants to recall a negative interpersonal experience and then 
guides them to adopt a lower-level perspective, higher-level perspective, or a perspective 
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combining both types of processing. Rumination will be measured one day and one week after 
the manipulation.  
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Chapter 2: Integrative Analysis of the Literature  
The following integrative analysis reviews several types of processing that are beneficial 
in reducing rumination after a negative event. The analysis begins with a broad discussion of 
rumination and psychopathology. The next section highlights several prominent theories of 
rumination. This is followed by an analysis of the recent research by Watkins and colleagues into 
the effects that processing at different levels of construal have on rumination. Then, research that 
conflicts with Watkins‟ current conceptualization is presented. The final section provides an 
examination of limitations in the current research and argues for research that combines multiple 
levels of processing in response to a negative life event.  
Rumination 
Defining Rumination 
Rumination has no unified definition. Nevertheless, the major theories probably have 
more in common than not; definitions discuss rumination as a form of repetitive thought that 
usually centers on themes of discrepancy between current and desired status and that stagnates 
processing (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Of the multiple theories of rumination, the most widely used 
comes from Nolen-Hoeksema‟s work on ruminative response styles. In this line of research, 
rumination was traditionally defined as “thoughts that focus one‟s attention on one‟s depressive 
symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). For 
example, the ruminative styles questionnaire developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) 
asks individuals to rate statements like, “I think about how hard it is to concentrate.” Recently, 
Nolen-Hoeksema has broadened her view, defining rumination “as the process of thinking 
perseveratively about one‟s feelings and problems” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008, p. 400). Others have taken an even more inclusive definition. For example, Martin and 
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Tesser (1996) defined rumination as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a 
common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands 
requiring the thoughts‟‟ (p. 7). A further exploration of various definitions will be presented with 
the specific theories of rumination. However, before discussing the intricacies of particular 
theories, it will be useful to examine why it is important to study rumination, namely, the 
connection between psychopathology and rumination research as a whole.  
Background on the Connection between Rumination and Psychopathology  
Rumination has been associated with several forms of psychopathology. For instance, 
rumination predicted heightened binge drinking and symptoms of alcohol abuse (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002). Other studies found 
that rumination has both an association with anxiety and an ability to predict anxiety (e.g., 
Ciarrochi et al., 2003; Fresco et al., 2002; Harrington & Blakenship, 2002). Furthermore, 
individuals who suffer from anxiety disorders often report greater rumination (Abbott & Rapee, 
2004). For example, individuals with social phobia will engage in negative rumination about a 
performance one week later whereas non-clinical controls do not. (Abbott & Rapee, 2004).  
The vast majority of rumination research has been focused on mood and depression 
symptoms. Research demonstrates that rumination is concurrently associated with depression, 
that rumination predicts the onset and severity of depression, and that when experimentally 
induced, rumination exacerbates sad mood (e.g., Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Butler & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). In addition, due to the high comorbidity of depression with 
other Axis I disorders (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001), it is difficult to 
discern the unique role that rumination may have in disorders beyond the connection to 
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depression. Because rumination has been central in mood and depression research, the 
relationship warrants a closer examination. Most research into depression and rumination can be 
discussed as fitting into one of three designs: cross-sectional, longitudinal, or experimental.  
Numerous cross-sectional studies have examined the relationship between rumination, 
depression, and negative affect. Cross-sectional research can be further divided into three main 
designs: (1) correlations between rumination and depressive symptoms (e.g., Abela, Vanderbilt, 
& Rochon, 2004; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002), (2) cross-sectional studies comparing the 
level of rumination in non-depressed controls and depressed individuals or the level of 
depression in ruminators and non-ruminators (e.g., Riso et al., 2003), or (3) studies that conduct 
both correlation and group difference designs (e.g., Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, & Sham, 
2003). In a review of over a 100 studies, Thomsen (2006) argued that cross-sectional research 
points to a positive association between depressive symptoms and rumination when sampling 
from non-depressed groups. Thomsen‟s review suggested that a positive yet weaker association 
exists for clinical samples. Additionally, cross-sectional studies found an association between 
rumination and depressive symptoms exists in children (Abela, Vanderbilt, & Rochon, 2004) and 
adolescents (Kuyken, Watkins, Holden, & Cook, 2006). Another important finding from the 
rumination literature is that rumination may partially explain greater occurrence of depression in 
women; several cross-sectional studies found that rumination accounts for part of the association 
between gender and depression (Grant et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999).  
Longitudinal studies suggest that rumination also predicts symptoms of dysphoria and 
depression. After accounting for baseline symptoms, several studies found that a tendency 
toward Nolen-Hoeksema‟s depressive rumination in non-depressed groups predicted depressive 
symptoms at later times (Abela, Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; 
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Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007; Verstraeten, Vasey, Raes, & 
Bijttebier, 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Utilizing a broader definition of rumination, repetitive 
thinking about negative subject matter, also predicted future depression (Rector & Roger, 1996; 
Ito, Takenaka, Tomita, & Agari, 2006; Ito, Takenaka, & Agari, 2005). Furthermore, the ability of 
rumination to predict depressive symptoms was also demonstrated in clinical samples (Raes et 
al., 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Rohan, Sigmon, & Dorhofer, 2003).  
 Experimental studies that have induced rumination-like thinking have shown several 
negative consequences. Often experiments compare a rumination group (e.g. “Think about the 
level of motivation you feel right now‟‟) with a distraction group that is directed to think about 
non-emotional content (e.g., „„Think about a fan slowly rotating back and forth” Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow, 1993). Several studies involving clinical populations found that 
rumination groups reported increased negative mood compared to distraction groups (Lavender 
& Watkins, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). In fact, Thomsen‟s (2006) 
review of experimental studies concludes that inducing rumination worsened sad mood 
compared to distraction. Moreover, experimental studies demonstrate that individuals who 
ruminate have poor problem-solving skills (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 1999) and may have reduced motivation. For instance, experimentally 
induced depressive rumination can reduce engagement in pleasant activities in dysphoric 
patients. (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
Rumination and Negative Events 
 Rumination may worsen the detrimental consequences brought on by a single negative 
event. For example, a ruminative response style predicts future depressive symptoms for events 
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such as a natural disaster or the death of a loved one (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). In addition, the interaction of rumination and negative 
cognitive styles following a negative life event has been shown to predict the lifetime rate of 
Major Depressive Disorder (Alloy et al., 2000). Whereas trait-like, stable tendencies to ruminate 
seem to have a role in depressive reactions, negative events also may increase state-like, transient 
rumination. Increases in rumination have been linked to interpersonal interactions (Rude et al. 
2009; Abbot & Rapee, 2004; Rachman, Grüter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000) and failure 
experiences (Watkins, 2004). Moberly and Watkins (2008) recently conducted a study to attempt 
to understand the relationship between rumination, negative life events, and negative affect. In an 
effort to get unbiased information, they utilized experience-sampling methodology -- participants 
reported their thoughts and experiences when an alarm on wrist-worn device sounded. The 
findings indicated that the more individuals ruminate about everyday stressful events, the more 
likely they are to experience distress (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). In addition, McIntosh and 
Martins (1992) have theorized that when single negative events are taken to be an indication of a 
more global failure, they can increase rumination and negative affect.  
Theories of Rumination 
 Smith and Alloy (2009), in their review of major research, point to at least ten theories of 
rumination. Some of these theories limit the definition of rumination to repetitive thoughts on a 
particular content area. For example, several theories focus specifically on rumination regarding 
depressive symptoms, sadness, or reactions to stressful events (Ruminative Response Styles 
Theory, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Rumination on Sadness, Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 
2000; Stress-Reactive Model of Rumination, Alloy et al., 2000). In addition, rumination theories 
may be limited in scope to explaining a specific construct, such as research on level of construal 
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(Watkins, 2008). Other theories attempt to be comprehensive by creating models that can explain 
broader definitions of rumination, focusing on achievement of life goals or self-regulation (Goal 
Progress Theory & Martin, 2006; Self Regulatory Executive Functioning, Wells & Matthews, 
1996). Smith and Alloy (2009) argue that there is a great deal of overlap, and for the most part, 
theories can be used to augment each other. As the central topic of the proposed study is the level 
of construal adopted during processing, the discussion will be mainly restricted to the two most 
pertinent theoretical models: Watkins‟ Level of Construal theory and Goal Progress Theory. 
However, because many other theories have built on the work of Nolen-Hoeksema‟s Response 
Styles Theory (RST, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), a basic understanding of RST‟s assumptions is 
useful. 
Response Styles Theory  
 The most widely used theory of rumination is Nolen-Hoeksema‟s Response Styles 
Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). RST defines rumination as repetitive thinking that focuses on 
the symptoms, causes, and consequences of negative mood. This theory holds that a ruminative 
coping style is learned in childhood. Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues suggest that this learning 
occurs through modeling by parents (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Mumme, 
Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or because parents act overcritical and controlling (Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al., 1995). In this conceptualization, rumination becomes a consistent style of responding to 
depressed mood or to trauma (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). 
RST suggests that a cyclic effect exists between rumination and depression. According to this 
hypothesis, negative mood maintains or increases negative thinking, and in turn, negative 
thinking maintains or increases negative mood. Thus, a vicious cycle exists that sustains 
depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). While there has been a 
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great deal of empirical support for many aspects of RST (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993;), several researchers have 
suggested that RST may be too restrictive in its definition to encompass all aspects of 
rumination.  
 The major criticisms of RST theory are that it does not address content other than 
symptoms and causes of negative mood nor does it explain findings pertaining to level of 
construal (Watkins, 2008; Martin & Tesser, 2006). Martin and Tesser (1996) suggest problems 
with limiting the possible topic of rumination to depressive symptoms or mood; they argue that if 
rumination is a style of thinking, it should not be restricted to specific content areas (i.e. 
symptoms and mood). For example, individuals may ruminate on the end of a relationship, but 
not necessarily the fact they are depressed. Other researches have also suggested that the content 
of rumination may not result from depressed mood but rather from negative events (Brinker & 
Dozois, 2009; Alloy et al., 2000). A final criticism that is relevant to this proposed study is that 
RST is not a broad enough theory to provide a full explanation of research involving levels of 
construal (Watkins, 2008). For instance, research has shown that the consequences of rumination 
may differ based on whether the content of the rumination is specific or general (Rimes & 
Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). It is this last point that has been the 
subject of recent research and interventions.  
Goal Progress Theory  
 Martin & Tesser (1989, 1996, 2006) proposed Goal Progress Theory to explain 
rumination within the Control Theory paradigm. Control Theory holds that people alter their 
behavior and mental activity to reduce discrepancies between their current state and desired 
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goals or outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990). Within these theories, goals or outcomes fall 
along a hierarchy. Higher-level goals are more abstract and occur across situations (e.g. being 
honest, Carver & Scheier, 1990). Lower-level goals may be connected to higher-level goals and 
represent specific actions or behaviors (e.g. telling the truth in a given situation). At any one 
time, individuals will be engaged in achieving multiple goals (Martin & Tesser, 2006). Lower-
level goals provide a map of how to carry out higher-level goals. On the other hand, higher-level 
goals are advantageous in that they direct behavior in a consistent way, increase motivation, and 
reduce impulsivity. (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989). However, 
problems may arise when progress toward higher-level goals is not achieved.  
Within the Goal Progress Theory literature, rumination is defined as “a class of conscious 
thoughts that revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of 
immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts‟‟ (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 7). 
Rumination arises when people are repeatedly thwarted or fail to progress toward important 
higher-level goals. To escape from the ruminative cycle individuals must disengage from the 
goal, find a substitute means of achieving it, or resume progress toward it (Martin & Tesser, 
2006).  
 Evidence suggests that when a goal is thwarted, information pertaining to that goal 
becomes highly accessible. Early support for this phenomenon comes from the work of 
Zeigarnik who hypothesized that needs cause tensions. Ziegarnik had subjects complete some 
tasks and leave others incomplete. She found that information pertaining to a task left incomplete 
was more likely to remain active in memory (Zeigarnik, 1938). More recently, in an experiment 
designed to test whether this tendency to remain active was automatic, Rothermund (2003) asked 
participants to complete two tasks. First, participants chose words in a synonym-matching task, 
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and received both positive and negative feedback on trials regardless of performance. In the 
second part of the experiment, participants had to name a word surrounded by two distracter 
words. The distracter words were selected from the earlier synonym task. When the distracters 
were from trials where the participant had previously received negative feedback, the reaction 
time of the participant was reduced. Thus, Rothermund concluded that participants were more 
vigilant to failures, because the failure words captured the attention even when the task required 
attention elsewhere. Martin and Tesser (2006) argue that this is directly related to the rumination 
that occurs following failure in goal progress. In fact, Goal Progress Theory proposes that the 
more important the goal, the more likely rumination is to occur (Martin & Tesser, 2006). For 
example, Lavallee and Campbell (1995) had participants keep a diary for two weeks, recording 
the most bothersome event each day. When the events were goal relevant and personally 
important, they were associated with higher levels of rumination.  
 According to Goal Progress Theory, disengaging from a frustrated goal is an effective but 
difficult means to lowering rumination (Martin & Tesser 2006; Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & de 
Pontet, 2007). Certain goals may be personally important but unlikely or impossible to fulfill 
(e.g. the desire to be a star quarterback after tearing both ACLs). In situations like this, 
disengaging from the goal is essential. Research has shown that individuals who were able to 
disengage from goals that they were not actively progressing toward and who adopted new goals 
had lower rumination (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, 
Carver, & Schulz, 2003). This process may be more effective in individuals with greater well-
being (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). Martin and Tesser (2006) argue that 
the multiple goals that an individual is pursuing at one time are in balance. Although the current 
configuration of goals may not be the ideal state, disengaging from a goal requires initially 
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unbalancing the current mix of goals; therefore, the individual may temporarily feel purposeless. 
Thus, disengaging from a goal is difficult. Martin and Tesser (2006) suggest that disengagement 
from old goals and reengagement in other goals may result more easily during trauma and/or 
brushes with death. In summation, research seems to demonstrate that disengaging from thwarted 
goals leads to a reduction in rumination. However, the procedure by which individuals 
accomplish disengagement is still unknown and is most likely a difficult process.  
 Perhaps, an easier way to end a ruminative cycle would be to find alternate low-level 
goals that accomplish a higher-level goal. For example, imagine an individual who had a goal of 
helping other people by joining the Peace Corps. If the application to the Peace Corps is denied, 
the individual might be able to find an alternate means of fulfilling the higher-level goal of 
helping other people. For instance, the individual could spend a year working in soup kitchens, 
and rumination could be prevented. One study asked college freshmen to identify the person they 
were closest to before coming to college and list activities that they engaged in together. The 
freshmen then listed the activities that they found substitutes for at college. Findings indicated 
that freshmen who were able to find substitute activities ruminated less about the person they had 
left behind (K. Millar, Tesser, & M. Millar, 1988). In a separate study, Koole et al. (1999) were 
interested in the various ways participants fulfilled the higher-level goal of self-worth. The study 
provided participants with failure feedback on a bogus intelligence test. Following the feedback, 
participants reported increased levels of rumination. The researchers hypothesized that this 
rumination was connected to the thwarting of the higher-level goal of self-worth. To test this 
hypothesis, they allowed some participants to affirm values important to their self-worth. The 
results indicated that participants who were allowed to affirm their self-worth had content 
pertaining to intelligence tests less accessible. In other words, when a substitute means of 
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fulfilling the higher goal of self-worth was found, rumination about the failure experience was 
reduced.  
This begs the questions, what hinders the discovery of alternative lower-level goals that 
fulfill the higher-order goal? One possible answer is that individuals may fixate on a certain 
lower-level goal as the only way of achieving a higher goal. Building on this basic premise, 
McIntosh and Martin (1992) proposed the goal linkage model, which holds people who link 
specific lower-level goals to the higher-level goal of happiness will have an increased rate of 
rumination. In their research, McIntosh and Martin compared linkers, individuals who believe 
happiness is contingent on fulfillment of certain goals, to non-linkers, individuals who do not see 
goal completion as necessary for happiness (McIntosh, Martin, & Jones, 2001). Findings 
indicated that linkers generally have higher rates of unhappiness (McIntosh and Martin, 1992) 
and depression (McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995). Additionally, these higher rates of negative 
affect are largely accounted for by the increase in rumination of individuals who linked lower 
and higher goals (McIntosh, Martin, & Jones, 2001; McIntosh and Martin, 1992; McIntosh, 
Harlow, & Martin, 1995; Martin & Tesser, 1996). Brothers and Madux (2003) applied the 
linkage model in an attempt to understand why certain infertile women experience more distress 
than others. Using survey methods, Brothers and Maddux asked participants who had attempted 
unsuccessfully to have a child for the last year to complete measures on linking (“e.g. “Having a 
biological child is essential to my happiness”), emotional distress, and rumination. Results 
indicated that linking predicted rumination. Furthermore, rumination predicted emotional 
distress. Rumination mediated the connection between linking and emotional distress. Moreover, 




 In summary, Goal Progress Theory explains several important aspects of rumination. 
Within this theory, rumination results when individuals cannot make progress toward reducing 
the discrepancy between their current state and their goals. Research has demonstrated that 
thwarting goals increases the accessibility of information pertaining to that goal. In addition, the 
more important the goal, the more likely rumination is to occur. One effective but difficult way 
to halt rumination is to disengage from a goal. Finding an alternative way to satisfy the goal can 
also reduce rumination. However, this may be problematic if the individual only sees specific 
ways of fulfilling a goal.  
Watkins’ Level of Construal Theory 
The Level of Construal Theory proposes that key in the development and formation of 
rumination is the degree of abstraction present when perceiving negative events. Watkins makes 
a distinction between two ways of perceiving events during prossessing: high-level, abstract 
construals and low-level, concrete construals. Though his definitions have gone through several 
iterations, recently, Watkins described abstract construals as “general, superordinate, and 
decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of events and 
actions, such as inferences of global traits that are invariant across different situations” or 
“representations of „why‟ an action is performed and of its ends and consequences.” Concrete 
construals are “lower-level mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, and 
incidental details of events and actions, such as inferences of situation-specific states” or 
“representations of the specific „how‟ details of an action and of the means to an end” (Watkins, 
Baeyens, & Read, 2009, p. 56). Building on RTS theorization that rumination focuses on the 
causes, consequences, and means of symptoms of depression, Watkins has proposed that 
thinking that is made up of abstract construals is related to rumination (Watkins, 2008). 
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Furthermore, Watkins has suggested that helping individuals to think and process information in 
a concrete way will reduce rumination and alleviate depressed mood (Watkins, 2008). On these 
premises, Watkins and colleagues developed an extensive research program.  
Watkins‟ work grew out of the research of Teasdale (1999) who found that mindful, 
experiential self-focus on emotional material facilitates processing. As a next step in researching 
these phenomena, several studies compared a conceptual-evaluative mode of self-focus with an 
experiential mode of processing (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins, 2004). These studies 
attempted to experimentally manipulate self-focus and examine the effect on rumination and 
depression. For example, one study, induced a failure experience and, subsequently, asked 
participants either a conceptual-evaluative question (i.e., „„Why did you feel this way?”) or an 
experiential question (i.e., “How did you feel moment-by-moment?‟‟). Results indicated that 
participants in the conceptual evaluative condition had more intrusive thoughts than the 
experiential group (Watkins, 2004). Watkins and colleagues have connected these findings to a 
parallel string of research, which examines processing negative content at different construal 
levels (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Raes, 
Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; Moberly & Watkins, 
2006).  
Several studies have examined whether level of construal influences rumination and 
affect. In one such study, Moberly and Watkins (2006) asked student volunteers to write about 
positive or negative scenarios from either a low-level, concrete construal mode (e.g., “Imagine 
the details of what is happening in each scenario”) or a high-level, abstract construal mode (e.g., 
“Think about the causes, meanings, and implications of each situation”). When this expressive 
writing task was followed by a failure task, construal level moderated the relationship between 
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rumination and negative affect. The results showed that high-trait ruminators had a reduced 
positive affect, but only in the abstract, construal mode group (Moberly & Watkins, 2006).  
In a separate study, a mixed student and community sample had less emotional reactivity to a 
failure task after adopting a concrete construal mode (Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). 
Additionally, Rimes and Watkins (2005) found that inducing participants to think from a highly 
analytic perspective increases ratings of self-worthlessness. Based on these studies, Watkins has 
argued that high-level analytic processing is a key component of rumination and depression 
(Watkins, 2008).  
Watkins theorized that if high-level, abstract processing is related to rumination, low-
level, concrete processing may break the ruminative cycle (Watkins, 2008). Based on this theory, 
Watkins implemented a concreteness training program with a dysphoric, clinical population 
(Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Participants were divided into either a concreteness group, 
bogus concreteness group, or a waiting list control. The concreteness training group received an 
initial 70 to 90 minute training session that via questioning, mental imagery, and other 
mechanisms encouraged concrete thinking. In this condition, participants were asked to notice 
specific details and context, attend to how events unfolded, and develop detailed plans for the 
future. Participants practiced independently what they learned in the initial training for 30 
minutes daily during the next week. Individuals in the bogus concreteness training condition 
received a similar amount of face to face interaction and practice but were not encouraged to 
think concretely. Results were mixed, with the concreteness training reducing overgeneral 
thinking more than the other conditions. However, in examining depressive symptoms, the 
concreteness group only faired better than the bogus concreteness training in terms of a 
structured interview and not other measures of depression, such as the Beck Depressive 
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Inventory (Beck, 1996) and Nolen-Hoeksema‟s Ruminative Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). However, the concreteness training group demonstrated greater 
improvement than the waiting list control group on both measures of depressive symptoms and 
rumination (Watkins et al., 2009).  
Recently, Watkins (2008) attempted to integrate the previous literature on rumination. He 
identified three factors that might determine whether repetitive thought leads to helpful or 
harmful consequences: (1) valance of the thought content (i.e. negative or positive), (2) 
intrapersonal context (e.g. self-esteem), and (3) the level of construal. Subsequently, Watkins 
examined several theories that could explain these factors. Ruminative Styles Theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) and Cognitive Theories (e.g., Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Janoff-
Bulman, 1992; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) did a fairly good job of accounting for valance and 
context but could not completely address for his recent work on level of construal. Watkins 
(2008) contends that Control Theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990), particularly the work of 
Martin and Tesser (1989), provides the fullest explanation of all three variables. In an attempt at 
integration, Watkins proposed that a level of construal maps directly onto a position in the goal 
hierarchy (Watkins, 2008).   
Disagreement within the Field 
 It is important to note that not all researchers are convinced that abstract, higher-level 
processing of negative content is always akin to rumination. Whereas Watkins‟ Level of 
Construal Theory holds that repetitively adopting higher-level construals in reference to negative 
content maintains a ruminative cycle, several researchers have found that abstract processing is 
not always detrimental (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2009). In fact, 
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experimental studies have demonstrated that abstract thought about negative consequences does 
not always increase rumination, and may, in fact reduce it.  
Early evidence that abstract processing might not always be akin to rumination comes 
from the work of Hunt. Hunt (1998) was interested in emotional processing and how to cope 
with dysphoria following a negative life event. For that reason, she conducted a study which 
asked participants to write from one of three perspectives following negative feedback on an IQ 
test: emotional processing (e.g., “…focus on how you feel” p. 365), disputation (e.g., 
“…question whether these test results have any relevance…” p. 365), or distraction (e.g., 
“….write…about your favorite television show…” p. 366). Of note, the emotional processing 
condition asked participants to think about the implications of the test results and the causes of 
the poor performance, which resembles Watkins analytic induction (e.g., Moberly and Watkins, 
2006) and Nolen-Hoeksema‟s conception of rumination (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Yet the 
following day, those in the emotional processing condition reported improved mood. The 
implication of this study indicates that focusing on negative content from at least a partial higher-
level perspective does not always lead to rumination and depression.  
 More recently, Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel (2005) investigated the level of construal 
(abstract “why” vs. concrete “what”) and the type of self-perspective adopted (self-immersed vs. 
self-distanced). They conducted a study that asked participants to recall an interpersonal event 
about which they still felt angry and, subsequently, adopt a perspective based on the four 
possible combinations of the two dimensions: self-immersed and “why”, self-immersed and 
“what”, self-distanced and “why”, and self-distanced and “what.” Whereas the self-immersed 
perspectives encouraged participants to relive the experience (e.g., „„go back to the time and 
place of the experience and relive the situation as if it were happening to you all over again . . .‟‟ 
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p. 711), the self-distanced perspectives asked participants to „„take a few steps back and move 
away from your experience… watch the conflict unfold as if it were happening all over again to 
the distant you…‟‟ (p. 711). For the second factor, level of construal, participants either thought 
about the feeling and sensations in the “what” condition or the reasons underlying their feeling in 
the “why” condition. Using negative affect as an outcome, the findings indicated that a 
distanced, abstract “why” perspective was more beneficial than the other groups. As the initial 
results for both the self-immersed and the self-distanced concrete “what” condition showed no 
improvement in affect, Kross and Ayduk argued for only including the two “why” conditions in 
the second part of the study examining emotional reactivity. In terms of emotional reactivity for 
the “why” groups, again the self-distanced perspective outperformed the self-immersed 
perspective (Kross & Ayduk, 2005). While this study examined anger provoking experiences, 
the findings provided support for the beneficial aspect of analytic processing. 
 As a next step in their research, Kross and Ayduk (2008) examined the two versions of 
the analytic thinking condition (immersed vs. distanced) in terms of a depression experience. In 
addition to the distancing (e.g., “…watch the experience unfold as if it were happening all over 
again to the distant you” p. 926) and self-immersed instructions (e.g., “relive the situation as if it 
were happening to you all over again…” p. 926), a distraction group was included that thought 
about unrelated topics (e.g., “pencils are made of graphite” p. 927). The results found that the 
self-distanced perspective outperformed the self-immersed and was marginally better than the 
distraction conditions one week after the manipulation. Therefore, in contrast to the work of 
Watkins and colleagues, Kross and Ayduk argue that in response to negative events, adoption of 
a self-distanced analytic perspective is helpful.  
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Further support for possible benefits of some types of higher-level, abstract processing 
comes from the work of Rude, Mazzetti, Pal and Stauble (2009). Rude and colleagues have 
suggested that a key component to the harmful effects of rumination is evaluation (Rude, 
Maestas, & Neff, 2007). Building on this premise, Rude et al. (2009) examined the conditions in 
the Watkins experiments and concluded that the abstract condition may be confounded with self-
judgment and evaluation. They suggested that in some of Watkins experiments this has been 
explicit, such as examining a romantic break up and asking participants to think (“At that 
moment, you stare at the table and contemplate your empty…”) from either a concrete- 
experiential (“glass”) or an abstract-evaluative way (“life”) (Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds, 
2008, p. 371). At other times, the evaluation may have been implicit, such as asking participants 
to “write about what reasons might have caused you to perform as you did” following a failure 
task (Watkins, 2004, p. 1043).  
To test their hypothesis that the harmful effects of abstract thinking may result from 
evaluation, Rude et al. (2009) attempted to experimentally separate the level of construal and 
evaluative dimensions. The study asked participants to recall a rejection experience and then 
write from one of three perspectives: abstract-evaluative (e.g. “Why do you think this 
happened?”), abstract-contextual (e.g. “How do you think you will view this event in 1 to 2 
years?”), concrete-experiential (e.g. “As you recall the event, what physical sensations do you 
experience in your body?”). Additionally, the study included a control condition which did not 
write. The findings indicated that the abstract-contextual conditions showed a reduction in 
rumination over the no writing control and the abstract-evaluative condition. The abstract-
evaluative condition did not show a significant difference from the control conditions. The 
findings also indicated that the concrete-experiential condition experienced less rumination than 
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the no writing control. Therefore, the results from this study corroborated Watkins‟ contention 
that concrete processing decreases rumination, but also differ from Watkins in that the results 
suggested that abstract processing also decreases rumination. 
In summary, Watkins theorized that rumination is akin to abstract thinking about negative 
content and situations (Watkins, 2008). He has demonstrated in an impressive body of work that 
thinking from a concrete perspective can improve rumination and reduce depression (e.g. 
Watkins, 2009). However, several researchers have found examples where abstract, higher-level 
construals do not worsen rumination, and can in some cases reduce rumination and improve 
overall mood (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2009).  
Limitations of Current Research 
A major problem with the current research is that it treats level of construal as either 
being only abstract or concrete. Though researchers in the field discuss the levels of construal as 
existing within a hierarchy that connects from low-level goals/construals to high-level 
goals/construals (e.g. Martin & Tesser, 2006; Watkins, 2008), studies to date have not included 
an experimental condition that traverses between the high and low. For example, Watkins‟ 
research only uses two conditions, some variation on abstract or analytic processing and concrete 
or experiential processing (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005; Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; 
Moberly &Watkins, 2006). This is also true for the research that argues for the benefits of 
abstract processing (Kross & Ayduk, 2005, 2008; Rude et al., 2009). It is possible that, by 
attempting to force thinking to be either abstract or concrete, researchers may be getting only a 




Possible Benefits of Mixing Abstract and Concrete Processing 
 There are several reasons to believe that adopting a mixture of abstract/high-level and 
concrete/low-level processing may be helpful in reducing rumination. Goal Progress Theory 
provides a framework for understanding these possible benefits. If rumination results from an 
individual perceiving a situation as demonstrating the thwarting of an important higher-level 
goal, then the higher-level goal may become highly accessible in the individual‟s consciousness. 
However, because this higher-level goal is so accessible, lower-goals that provide situation 
specific information of how to resume progress are blocked.  Therefore, the individual becomes 
stuck in a repetitive focus on a single higher-level goal. Watkins (2009) has suggested that low-
level, concrete processing can be helpful by focusing individuals on the present situation or 
situational factors of past negative events. Thus, concrete processing moves the individual away 
from a strict focus on the problematic higher-level goals. Still, there are several reasons to 
believe that moving back and forth between lower-level and higher-level goals may be 
beneficial. Thinking abstractly may provide greater context and alternative lower-level examples 
of progress toward high-level goals. In addition, if the link between a negative event and a 
higher-level goal is made explicit, then concrete future planning may become easier and more 
organized.  
 One possible benefit of using abstract, higher-level construals in combination with 
concrete construals is that abstract construals provide context. For example, Control Theory 
posits that higher-level goals are consistent across situations, encourage personal meaning, and 
ensure that lower-level goals remain directed toward achieving higher-level goals (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). If an individual is ruminating on a negative event, the event may be connected to 
a higher-order goal (McIntosh and Martin, 1992). In addition, the individual may think of this 
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negative event as the only evidence of movement regarding the higher-level goal. However, it is 
possible that thinking more directly about the higher-level goal may increase context and lead to 
alternative examples of progress. For instance, if a friendship ends, a person might connect this 
event with the higher-order goal of maintaining good relationships. Furthermore, the individual 
might enter a ruminative cycle where thoughts such as “this friendship ended; I am no good with 
people” continually arise. Once stuck in this cycle, alternative examples of progress toward this 
goal within his/her life might not be activated. For example, the individual might currently have 
other good friendships or may have had other good friendships in the past. By concentrating on 
the higher-level, the discovery of alternative lower-level examples of progress toward the higher-
level goal may be facilitated. On the other hand, if individuals move directly to lower-level 
processing, such as reliving the event, they may add greater context to the event itself which 
could minimize the perceived impact of this single event on the higher-order goal. Still, concrete 
processing alone might not allow benefits gained from finding alternative examples of goal 
progress. Theoretically, having abstract thoughts guide the lower-level processing could do more 
to move the individual out of the ruminative cycle. Evidence suggests that finding alternative 
means to satisfy higher-level goals reduces rumination. (e.g., K. Millar, Tesser, & M. Millar, 
1988). More support comes from research into self-worth. When individuals were allowed to 
affirm their values connected to the higher-order goal of self-worth, rumination about failures 
was reduced (Koole et al., 1999). Therefore, it is at least reasonable to hypothesize that moving 
to a higher level of thought might provide greater context and more alternative examples of 
progress. In fact, this might account for the success of the abstract contextual condition in the 
Rude at al. (2009) study.  
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Another way abstract processing may augment concrete processing is by allowing 
individuals to plan for the future. Goal Progress Theory hypothesizes that one way to end a 
ruminative cycle is to resume progress toward a higher-level goal (Martin & Tesser, 2006). 
Watkins suggested that concrete processing does this by allowing small steps forward (Watkins, 
2009). He has argued that when an event is novel or stressful, higher-level thinking will not have 
the elaboration to direct people down the hierarchy and have them move forward (Watkins, 
2008). However, research findings from Action Identification Theory indicate that individuals 
who think about the larger meaning of their actions are more organized, whereas concrete 
processing has been associated with more impulsivity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Therefore, a 
purely concrete focus may be more disorganized and a purely abstract focus may not allow for 
concrete plans for the future. Consequently, perhaps the best solution is to use a combination of 
the two. By moving back and forth between multiple levels of the hierarchy, the individual can 
resume progress though organized specific steps toward longer term goals. 
Is there a benefit to higher-level construal processing in the absence of lower-level 
construals? It seems logical that during rumination, higher-level construals in isolation, such as 
thinking about the meaning of events or one‟s happiness, would not provide concrete examples 
of past progress toward goals or specific ways to move forward. Therefore, rumination seems to 
follow from isolated higher-level thinking. Yet, the findings from several independent research 
labs suggest that higher-level, abstract manipulations have benefits for reducing rumination. Still, 
the Kross and Ayduk (2008) manipulation involving taking the perspective of the “distanced 
you” and the Rude et al. (2009) manipulation involving viewing events from a future perspective 
or as an outside observer seem to direct participants in a similar way. In addition to removing 
evaluation, it could be argued that these manipulations in essence combine higher-level and 
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lower-level goals; they pull for first moving to a general, higher-level perspective and then, 
though not explicitly stated, suggest movement to concrete examples. For instance, by viewing 
events from a “distanced” self-perspective (Kross &Ayduk, 2008) or the self “1-2 years” in the 
future (Rude et al., 2009), the individual can weigh the repercussions of the single negative event 
in the context of imagined, future examples of progress toward the higher-level goal. Similarly, 
when viewing an event “as an outside observer,” an individual can imagine alternative examples 
of progress taken from the outside observer‟s life. On the other hand, Watkins and colleagues‟ 
higher-level manipulations do not pull for moving back down the goal hierarchy. These 
manipulations simply ask, “Why do you feel this way?” (Watkins, 2004). As such, it could be 
argued that abstract manipulations that do not move back down the hierarchy seem harmful, 
whereas abstract manipulations that ask, even implicitly, for alternate concrete examples are 
helpful.  
Recent work has demonstrated that the level of construal adopted when faced with 
negative events influences the severity of rumination. Watkins and colleagues have argued that 
abstract processing is related to rumination and that concrete processing can break the ruminative 
cycle. Other theorists have found that abstract processing decreases the levels of rumination. A 
problem with both types of research is that they treat processing as either abstract or concrete. 
The effect of traversing the goal hierarchy to both abstract and concrete construals has not been 
studied. Because rumination has been shown to be associated with, to predict, and perhaps, to be 
key in the maintenance of depression, more research is needed to fully understand which types of 
processing are most useful in reducing rumination. 
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Chapter 3: Proposed Research Study 
Statement of Purpose 
 The aim of this study is to explore whether adopting certain levels of construal can 
reduce rumination when processing a negative social interaction. Several theories propose that 
events can be perceived with different levels of abstraction and that the levels form a construal 
hierarchy (Martin & Tesser, 2006; Watkins, 2008). Lower levels within the construal hierarchy 
are referred to as concrete and are made up of specific details of events and the procedures to 
carry out immediate tasks. Higher levels within the construal hierarchy are referred to as abstract 
and are made up of general meanings of events and long-term goals. For the purposes of this 
study, level of processing will refer to the particular perspective within the construal hierarchy 
adopted by an individual.  
This study will attempt to fill a void in current research by not only including concrete 
and abstract processing conditions, but also a condition that asks participants to process events at 
both levels. The study will have a repeated measures design comparing a concrete, an abstract, a 
mixed and a control condition at a pretest, a posttest one day later, and a posttest one week later 
on three measures of rumination and one measure of negative affect. The usefulness of a 
particular level of processing will be determined by the levels of rumination and negative affect 
compared to a control both one day and one week following the manipulation. Negative affect 
was included as a separate dependent variable because studies have demonstrated that reductions 
in rumination often occur with lower levels of negative affect and depressive symptoms 
(Watkins, 2009; Rude et al., 2009; Moberly & Watkins, 2008).  Therefore, the purpose is 
twofold; the study will attempt to (1) replicate the findings of Rude et al. (2009) regarding the 
benefits of abstract processing in reducing rumination and negative affect and (2) determine if a 
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combined abstract and concrete processing condition will be more beneficial than concrete 
processing or abstract processing alone. 
Research Questions 
The proposed study seeks to understand the following questions as they pertain to 
individuals who recently experienced a negative social interaction:  
1. Will individuals guided to adopt a concrete level of processing have significantly lower 
levels of rumination and/or negative affect compared to individuals in a control condition 
when measured both one day and one week later?  
2. Will individuals guided to adopt an abstract level of processing have significantly lower 
levels of rumination and/or negative affect compared to individuals in a control condition 
when measured both one day and one week later? 
3. Will individuals guided to adopt a mixed level of processing have significantly lower levels 
of rumination and/or negative affect compared to individuals in a control condition when 
measured both one day and one week later? 
4. Will individuals guided to adopt a mixed level of processing differ significantly in the level 
of rumination and/or negative affect from individuals guided to adopt an abstract or a 
concrete level of processing when measured both one day and one week later? 
Method 
Approval by Human Subject Committee 
The proposed study will be in compliance with the guidelines set forth by the Institutional 




 Participants will be 220 undergraduate students recruited through the Department of 
Educational Psychology‟s subject pool at the University of Texas at Austin. Similar studies 
found significant results with medium effect sizes (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Watkins, 2009). 
For the proposed statistical methods, power level of .95, an alpha of .05 and an f of .25, a 
G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) analysis suggested a sample size of 188. The 
requested sample size of 220 participants attempts to compensate for attrition and non-
compliance. Eligibility to participate in the study will be based on a “yes” answer to the 
prescreening question, “In the past two months have you experienced an interaction with another 
person lasting no more than a day that continually bothers you (e.g., an argument with a friend, 
an end of a relationship, or a disagreement with a parent)?” Participants will receive course credit 
in return for participation in the study.  
Measures 
The Rumination about an Interpersonal Offense Scale (RIO, Wade et al., 2008) is a 6–
item scale designed to assess rumination about a specific situation. Because most scales measure 
disposition to ruminate, Wade and colleagues designed the RIO to fill the need for an instrument 
focussed on rumination about a specific event. The six items were selected to represent a single 
construct. Individuals are asked to rate specific statements (e.g., I can‟t stop thinking about how I 
was wronged by this person.) on a Likert scale with scores ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree). Though the RIO is a relatively new measure, Wade et al. tested it on three 
separate samples, two undergraduate and one clinical. Reliability using Cronbach‟s Alpha was 
found to be above .90 for all three samples. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the RIO 
does measure a separate construct other than dispositional rumination. However, the RIO was 
correlated to several other rumination variables. Principle factor analysis resulted in a single 
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factor solution, thus, suggesting unidimensionality. Whereas the original RIO asks participants to 
refer to the past 7 days, the version used here only references the last day.  
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Hoeksema & Nolan 1991) is one of the most 
frequently used instruments that measures tendency to ruminate when focused on the self (e.g., 
„„think „Why am I the only person with these problems?‟‟‟), symptoms (“Think about your 
feelings of fatigue and achiness”), or consequences of the depressive mood (e.g., „„think „I won‟t 
be able to do my job/work because I feel so badly‟‟). The items were scored 1 (Never), 2 
(Sometimes), 3 (Often) or 4 (Almost Always). Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) reported 
good internal consistency (α = .89) and predicative validity in terms of depression. Because the 
RRS is the most widely used measure, it will be included in the proposed study. In addition, the 
RRS provides a measure of dispositional rumination in contrast to situational. The RRS will be 
modified to reference the past day. Using the same modification, Rude et al. (2009) found an 
alpha of .91. 
The Internet Based Word Recognition Task will display a word with some of the letters 
omitted and ask participants to click on the screen as soon as they recognize the word. The 
omitted letters within the word will appear as asterisks. For example, a participant might see 
“c*f*e*,” which could be solved as “coffee.” Participants will go through 20 such trials. The 
computer will record the reaction time taken to make a decision. Within the groups of words, 
there will be 10 words dealing with social interaction. These words will be chosen based on a 
pilot study, which will be conducted to determine the most frequent words used when asked to 
describe negative social interactions. The ratio of the latency on the social interaction words 
compared to the neutral words will be used as the outcome measure. As participants will 
complete this task three times, the words will be randomly selected without replacement for each 
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subject. Therefore, each participant will see all 30 social interaction words, but the particular set 
and order will differ. Faster reaction times on social interaction words will indicate greater 
rumination as it is indicative of these words having greater mental accessibility. Similar tasks 
have been used by Koole et al. (1999) and Rothermund (2003). 
The Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 
brief self-report measure of affect. It consists of a 10-item scale that measures positive affect and 
a 10-item scale that measures negative affect. The proposed study will use only the negative 
affect scale. The PANAS will present adjectives that describe mood states (e.g., distressed, upset, 
scared, irritable). Participants will be asked to rate how much they felt a mood state during the 
past day on a five-point scale, extending from: 1 = “not at all,” to 5 = “very much.” An overall 
score on the negative affect scale is obtained by adding the scores on the individual items. The 
PANAS is a widely used measure of affect and has been shown to have good reliability and 
validity (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Procedure 
Overview. The proposed study utilizes a repeated measures design with a single between 
subjects factor made up of four processing conditions. The within factor is composed of three 
measurement sessions. In Session 1, participants will complete pre-measures (RIO, RSS, the 
word completion task, and the PANAS) and will complete one of four randomly assigned 
processing conditions. Session 2 involves completing the RIO, RSS, the word completion task 
and the PANAS, 24 hours after the initial session. Finally, during Session 3, the same measures 
will be completed one week later. All sessions will be accomplished via a web-based data 
collection tool. Twenty-four hours prior to completing each session, participants will receive a 
reminder that they will be taking part in a study about a social interaction that still bothers them.  
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 Session 1. Participants who reported having recently experienced a social interaction that 
still bothers them will be asked to complete online surveys. After providing consent, participants 
will select a five-digit code based on their mothers‟ first name and their birthday. This code will 
allow the data from the three sessions to be linked while, at the same time, removing identifiable 
information. Subsequently, demographic information will be collected. Participants will then be 
asked to call to mind the social interaction that still bothers them and describe it. Additionally, 
they will be prompted to rate how much the experience still bothers them. In order to obtain pre-
manipulation levels, participants will complete the RRS, RIO, the word recognition task, and the 
PANAS. Random assignment will be used to place participants into concrete, abstract, mixed, or 
control processing conditions.  
Session 2 and Session 3. Session 2 will occur twenty-four hours after finishing the 
manipulation. Participants will login using the five-digit code selected earlier. They will then 
once again be asked to remember the social interaction that had initially bothered them and write 
about it for a few minutes. Subsequently, they will complete the measures for the second time. 
The final part of Session 2 will ask participants to rate how honestly and accurately they 
answered the questions on a 5-point Likert scale (1 “not honest or accurate” to 5 “completely 
honest and accurate”). This rating will be used to exclude participants who were not honest from 
the analyses. Session 3 will follow the exact same procedure as Session 2 but will include a 
debriefing at the end of the session.  
Conditions 
The three active conditions will attempt to elicit thinking about the negative social 
interaction that varies in terms of the level within the goal hierarchy at which participants are 
focused. The abstract and concrete conditions will encourage participants to focus attention at 
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relatively high (abstract) and low (concrete) levels of their goal hierarchies, respectively. The 
mixed condition is a combination of both abstract and concrete goals and will ask participants to 
move both up and down the hierarchy. There will also be a control condition that will not attempt 
to alter the level in the goal hierarchy. All participants will be asked to write in response to a 
series of prompts and all conditions will begin with the prompt, “Think of a social interaction 
lasting no more than a day that still bothers you.” Subsequent prompts will be specific to the 
particular condition.  
The Concrete Condition. The concrete condition will be based on a slightly modified 
version of Watkins‟ concreteness training (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006). Similar to the Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2008) study, there will be four areas 
that the instructions address: (a) sensory details of the moment, (b) noticing the situation 
surrounding the event, (c) noticing the process of how events and behaviors unfold, and (d) 
generating detailed step-by-step plans of how to proceed. The actual concrete condition will 
proceed as follows: 
 Go back to the interaction and focus on the sensory details in the moment. Write down 
four sensory sensations. For example, one sensation might be what you are able to see. 
Another might be what you hear or feel. 
 Remembering the context, environment, and situation within which the social interaction 
took place, write down two things that you noticed or that are notable to you now about 
the situation. 
 Notice the process of your thinking and feeling behaviors as events unfolded. Describe 
these in writing (filling the box below). 
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 Considering the upcoming week, think about small but detailed steps that you could take 
this upcoming week to move past this experience. Write these steps in the box below. 
The Abstract Condition. The abstract is designed to stimulate abstract thought and 
consideration of higher-level goals. Abstract thinking is often experimentally manipulated by 
asking participants “why” questions or by having them evaluate the causes, meaning, and 
implication of scenarios (e.g. Watkins, 2004; Moberly & Watkins, 2006). As discussed in the 
integrative analysis, Rude et al. (2009) argue that many of the previous experimental 
manipulations were confounded by an implicit or explicit pull for negative self-judgment. 
Following the example from their study, the wording of this condition did not include any 
explicit statements that would increase judgment. Avoiding implicit judgment is more 
complicated to implement. However, one way that previous research has implicitly pulled for 
judgment is by focusing on causes or why someone performed actions that led to a negative 
event. Therefore, the abstract conditions will ask participants to focus on the event as a whole 
and then move up the hierarchy by focusing on what is generally important to them. The abstract 
conditions will proceed as follows: 
 Think what about it bothers you. List four reasons that this interaction bothers you. 
 Look at these four reasons. What do these reasons say about what is important to you (i.e. 
what values, goals, or “desired states” are affected by the interaction). Write down two of 
these important goals that are affected by the interaction. 
 Look at your two goals. Choose one of these goals and write about it. Describe why this 
is important to you (filling the box below). 
 Think about general changes you could make based on this goal to move past this 
experience. Write these changes in the box below 
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The Mixed Condition. The mixed condition is a combination of the two previous conditions. 
The condition will begin with higher level processing and then move to a lower level. This 
decision was made because, in theory, moving to a higher-level might allow the individual to 
organize the search better by listing a higher-level goal, and then, proceed down to alternate 
examples of how that higher-level goal could be reached. The mixed condition will proceed as 
follows: 
 Think what about it bothers you. List four reasons that this interaction bothers you. 
 Look at these four reasons. What do these reasons say about what is important to you (i.e. 
what values, goals, or “desired states” are affected by the interaction). Write down two of 
these important goals that are affected by the interaction. 
 Look at your two goals. Choose one of these goals and write about it. Describe why this 
is important to you (filling the box below). 
 Go back to the interaction and focus on the sensory details in the moment. Write down 
four sensory sensations. For example, one sensation might be what you are able to see. 
Another might be what you hear or feel. 
 Remembering the context, environment, and situation within which the social interaction 
took place, write down two things that you noticed or that are notable to you now about 
the situation. 
 Notice the process of your thinking and feeling behaviors as events unfolded. Describe 
these in writing (filling the box below). 
 Think about the important goal you listed. With this goal in mind, think about small but 
detailed steps that you could take this upcoming week to move past this experience. 
Write these steps in the box below. 
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The Control Condition. The objective of this condition is to have participants think about 
the experience to the same extent as the other conditions and to negate any effect that simply 
writing about the experience will have, but at the same time, not influence their current level in 
the goal hierarchy: 
 Write about the experience (filling the box below).  
 Write about how you will move past this experience. 
Manipulation Check. Two independent judges, blind to the conditions, will be trained to 
evaluate the responses for the level of construal portrayed. Judges will rate responses as falling 
into five categories: (1) Mostly concrete, (2) mixed with more concrete elements, (3) a generally 
even mix of both concrete and abstract elements, (4) mixed with more abstract elements, and (5) 
mostly abstract. Judges will be graduate or undergraduate research assistants. If good inter-judge 
reliability exists, results will be averaged across the two judges. 
Results 
Four separate 3 (Session) X 4 (Condition) repeated measures ANOVAS, one for each 
dependent measure (i.e. RIO, RRS, the word completion task, and the PANAS) will be 
conducted to answer the five research questions. Session will be a within subject factor and will 
consist of three points: pre-manipulation (Session 1), 24 hours after the manipulation (Session 2), 
and one week after the manipulation (Session 3). Condition will be a between subjects factor and 
consist of the abstract, concrete, mixed, and the control conditions. Because the RIO is a new 
instrument and it is unclear whether it is highly correlated with the RRS, separate ANOVAs were 
selected rather than a single MANOVA. Furthermore, the RIO and the RRS may measure 
separate constructs; conceptually, the RRS measures trait or dispositional rumination, whereas 
the RIO was specifically designed to measure state rumination (Wade et al., 2008). This provides 
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additional support to the decision to use ANOVAs over a single MANOVA. Because the relation 
of all time periods could be examined at once, repeated measures ANOVAs were used rather 
than separate ANCOVAs. An alpha value of .05 will be used for all statistical tests.  
Before the overall analyses are conducted, the assumptions for a repeated measures 
ANOVA will be tested. Spericity, normality for the repeated measures, and homogeneity of 
variance for the between-subjects factor will be examined.  Preliminary analyses will check 
random assignment and test for group differences based on Sex or Race. Once checks on the 
assumptions have been made and preliminary analyses conducted, analyses will be performed 
based on the research questions.  
Overall Analysis 
Sessions X Condition interaction will be examined for significance for each dependent 
measure. The Main effect will be examined for the within subjects factor to determine if 
rumination and negative affect were reduced from Session 1. Furthermore, a test will be 
performed to check for group differences at Session 1 on each dependent measure. Should the 
interaction prove significant and no significant differences exist at Session 1, the interaction will 
be decomposed using t-tests. According to Stevens (2007), so long as unequal group sizes and 
unequal covariance matrices do not both exist, the Bonferroni correction keeps the overall alpha 
below .05. Therefore, this procedure will be used with the comparisons below. 
Specific Analyses 
Hypothesis 1. It is hypothesized that participants in the concrete conditions will have 
significantly lower levels of rumination, as measured by the RIO, RRS, and the word completion 
task, and a significantly lower negative affect, as measured by the PANAS, when compared to 
the participants in the control condition. 
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Analysis 1. Planned comparison will be made between the concrete and control 
conditions at Session 2 and Session 3 for each dependent measure.  
Rationale 1. A large body of research points to the benefits of adopting a concrete 
perspective when processing a negative event (e.g. Moberly and Watkins, 2006; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004; Watkins, 2004). Studies demonstrate both a reduction in rumination and 
negative affect following concrete manipulations (Rude et al., 2009; Moberly & Watkins, 2006). 
Furthermore, a recent study that utilized concreteness training reduced participant‟s level of 
rumination and depressive symptoms compared to a control (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). 
As the concrete condition proposed here is based on that study‟s condition, a similar reduction in 
rumination is expected here. Previous research has demonstrated that manipulating the level of 
processing can have an immediate effect on rumination (e.g., Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins 
and Moulds, 2005). In addition, several studies found effects have lasted from twelve hours to 
one week (Watkins, 2004; Kross & Ayduk, 2009). Consequently, in the present study, similar 
results are expected for both Session 2 and Session 3. 
Hypothesis 2. It is hypothesized that participants in the abstract conditions will have a 
significantly lower level rumination as measured by the RIO, RRS, and the word completion 
task, and a significantly lower negative affect, as measured by the PANAS, when compared to 
the participants in the control condition at Session 2 and Session 3. 
Analysis 2. Planned comparisons will be made between the abstract and control 
conditions at Session 2 and Session 3 for each dependent measure. 
Rationale 2. Whereas Watkins (2008) argued that abstract processing increases 
rumination, Rude et al. (2009) found that it is was beneficial compared to a control condition. In 
fact, abstract conditions used in other experiments have lead to reduction in rumination and 
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depressed affect (Kross and Ayduk, 2008; Rude et al., 2009). In addition, Rude et al. (2009) 
proposed that the reason for the disparate finding is that their research, unlike previous research, 
included abstract conditions that removed evaluation. The abstract condition in the present study 
was designed to neither pull for negative judgment nor self-evaluation. Therefore, it is believed 
that this experiment should replicate the findings of Rude et al.  
Hypothesis 3. Participants in the mixed condition will each have a significantly lower 
level of rumination, as measured by the RIO, RRS, and the word completion task, and 
significantly lower negative affect, as measured by the PANAS, compared to the control 
condition at Session 2 and Session 3. 
Analysis 3. Planned paired comparisons will be utilized to determine if the mixed 
condition is significantly lower than the control condition at Session 2 and Session 3 for each 
dependent measure.  
Rationale 3.As discussed in the integrative analysis, there are several reasons to believe 
that the mixed condition will lower rumination and reduce negative affect. The previous 
hypotheses suggest that concrete and abstract conditions will each be individually beneficial. 
And while combining the two conditions would appear beneficial, due to the possibility of an 
unknown interaction, that outcome is not guaranteed. However, several theoretical reasons 
suggest that the mixed condition would be useful in reducing rumination and negative affect. A 
combination of both abstract and concrete processing may reduce rumination by guiding the 
discovery of alternative specific examples of progress toward a goal or add greater context to 
how to proceed forward in the future.  Several studies that have demonstrated reduction in 
rumination after manipulating the level of processing have also demonstrated reductions in 
negative affect or depressive symptoms (Kross and Ayduk, 2008; Rude et al., 2009; Watkins, 
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2009). Therefore, it may be that the mixed level of processing will also reduce negative affect. 
The mixed condition has not been examined before. Therefore, although effects of the conditions 
at Session 3 are predicted to be similar to the effects at Session 2, it is important to examine the 
possibility of a time interaction 
Hypothesis 4.It is hypothesized that the mixed condition will have significantly lower 
levels of rumination, as measured by the RIO, RSS, and the word completion task, and 
significantly lower negative affect, as measured by the PANAS, than the abstract or concrete 
conditions at Session 2 and Session3.  
Analysis 4.Planned comparisons will be made between the mixed and the concrete 
conditions and between the mixed and abstract conditions at Session 2 and Session 3 for each 
dependent variable.  
Rationale 4. Goal Progress Theory hypothesizes that abstract processing provides 
organization, direction, and continuity across situations. On the other hand, concrete processing 
supplies the specific details and steps needed to reach higher goals (Martin & Tesser, 2006). 
Watkins argues that concrete processing can move an individual out of rumination by allowing 
the individual to take specific steps to move forward and redirect individuals away from general 
questions about meanings and consequences (Watkins, 2008). However, a strict focus on the 
concrete level has also been shown to increase impulsivity (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In 
addition, Rude et al. (2009) hypothesized that abstract processing can be beneficial in giving 
individuals context beyond focusing on the connection between higher-level goals and a specific 
event. Consequently, the marriage of abstract processing and guided concrete processing could 
not only provide context and direction, but also the specific means to move forward and examine 
the details of the present situation. Furthermore, whereas the abstract condition may implicitly 
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pull for finding alternate concrete examples of ways to proceed forward, the mixed condition 
explicitly guaranties such a search. In these ways, the mixed condition may be more effective 
than the abstract or concrete conditions alone. The mixed condition has not been examined 
before. Therefore, although effects of the conditions at Session 3 are predicted to be similar to 
the effects at Session 2, it is important to examine the possibility of a time interaction. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
Summary and Implication 
 Rumination is an important construct to study due to its association with and ability to 
predict depression and other psychopathologies. Negative life events can increase rumination and 
its harmful effects. Because of the role of rumination in psychopathology, researchers seek to 
understand the mechanisms that can end a cycle of preseverative thought. Watkins proposes that 
engaging in a concrete mode of processing may break the ruminative cycle and that abstract 
processing maintains rumination (Watkins, 2008). In contrast, other researchers have found 
benefits to abstract processing (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Rude et al., 2009). Framed within Goal 
Progress Theory, which holds that rumination occurs when individuals do not make progress 
toward higher-level, abstract goals (Martin & Tesser, 2006), the present study seeks to 
understand what types of processing are most effective in reducing rumination.  
 The current study proposes that if an individual is ruminating about a particular event, 
then a mixture of abstract and concrete processing may be effective in reducing rumination.  In 
theory, this is accomplished by encouraging the individual to explore alternate examples of goal 
fulfillment and take practical steps forward to achieve higher–level goals. Should the hypotheses 
be upheld, the results would suggest that engaging in either abstract or concrete processing could 
reduce rumination and negative affect. However, the results would also suggest that while either 
a concrete or abstract mode of processing could be beneficial, a mixed mode that makes use of 
multiple levels within the hierarchy would be most effective at reducing rumination and negative 
affect. Furthermore, as the reduction in rumination will have been sustained over a period of a 
week, the results might suggest lasting effects.  
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 In addition, findings could be discussed with respect to the individual rumination 
measures. Should the proposed hypotheses hold for the RIO, it might indicate that guiding the 
level of processing could reduce rumination about the specific event. On the other hand, should 
the hypotheses hold for the word completion task, it might indicate that guiding the level of 
processing could reduce rumination about interpersonal interactions in general. Finally, should 
the hypotheses hold for the RRS, results might indicate that engaging in a particular mode of 
processing could reduce rumination pertaining to general problems and symptoms. Although the 
proposed study would be a first step, it could eventually lead to possible interventions for 
individuals experiencing rumination.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The study has some limitations worth mentioning. First, the study utilizes student 
volunteers. Therefore, a selection bias may exist that may make generalization to other 
populations difficult. In addition, many of the participants would come from the same classes. 
Though the study would ask participants to refrain from discussing the experiment with anyone 
else, there is a danger that students might talk about the experiment during the week between 
Session 2 and Session 3. Furthermore, as the participants will be college students, as opposed to 
clinical populations, it is possible that the initial rumination levels could be low.  This might 
leave little room for a reduction.  
 By including the word stem task, an attempt was made to avoid sole reliance on self-
report measures. Still, the online format would give participants the opportunity to avoid taking 
the experiment seriously. To counter this possibility, participants would be asked at the end of 
each session if they answered honestly and accurately.  It is hoped that students who did not give 
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their full attention to the task could then be filtered out. However, there is still the possibility of 
inaccuracy due to the self-report nature of these checks.  
 Several important questions exist that the study does not answer. If the abstract condition 
does in fact reduce rumination, it is unclear whether this could be the result of an implicit shift to 
the concrete level. Whereas the manipulation check will provide some insight, it is difficult to 
know what level of processing is really being engaged. Additionally, the proposed study would 
not answer what aspect of abstract processing is detrimental. Instead, the study would determine 
whether abstract processing could be beneficial and whether combining abstract and concrete 
processing could have a greater impact on the reduction of rumination than concrete processing 
alone. Although more research would be needed to decipher the specific influences of each level 
of processing, the study would be an important first step in understanding the types of processing 











1. What is your sex? 
__ Male  
__ Female 
 
2. What is your age? 
__ 
 




___ Native American  
___ White  
___ Bi or Multi-Racial 
___ Other: 
 
4. Please enter the first 3 letters of your mother's first name followed by the 2-digit month and 2-
digit day of your birthday. For example, if your mother's name is Elizabeth and your birthday is 
June 5th, your code would be: "ELI0605". Please use all CAPITAL letters.  
 
This code will allow us to match up the different parts of your data. We will not be attempting to 









Recall the social interaction experience you selected for this study (An interaction with another 
person lasting no more than a day that continually bothers you). Think back over your 
experiences in the last day and indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 














1. I can‟t stop thinking about how I was wronged by this person.  
2. Memories about this person‟s wrongful actions have limited my enjoyment of life.  
3. I have a hard time getting thoughts of how I was mistreated out of my head. 
4. I try to figure out the reasons why this person hurt me.  
5. The wrong I suffered is never far from my mind. 




















Please read each of the items below and indicate how often, within the PAST DAY, you have 
thought or done each one. Please indicate what you generally have done, not what you think you 












1 Think about how alone you feel  
2 Think “I won‟t be able to do my job if I don‟t snap out of this.”  
3 Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  
4 Think about how hard it is to concentrate  
5 Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  
6 Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel  
7 Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  
8 Think about how you don‟t seem to feel anything anymore  
9 Think “Why can‟t I get going?”  
10 Think “Why do I always react this way?”  
11 Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  
12 Write down what you are thinking and analyze it  
13 Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  
14 Think “I won‟t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  
15 Think “Why do I have problems other people don‟t have?”  
16 Think “Why can‟t I handle things better?”  
17 Think about how sad you feel  
18 Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  
19 Think about how you don‟t feel up to doing anything  
20 Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  
21 Go someplace alone to think about your feelings  












This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent 
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